UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT: AN APPLAUSE TO THE KENYAN JUDICIARY FOR THE TRANSFORMATIVE INTERPRETATION
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The goal of sentencing in the
judicial system is multifaceted, aiming at retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation,
restorative justice, community protection, and denunciation.[1]
These goals, however, can sometimes be in conflict, raising critical questions
about how they are achieved through judicial decisions. This blog reviews how
the Kenyan Judiciary has addressed these issues, particularly focusing on the
transformative jurisprudence regarding the unconstitutionality of life
imprisonment. Globally, the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) asserts that the primary objectives of imprisonment should be
the reformation and social rehabilitation of the criminal.[2]
This sets a foundational principle that punishment should offer a pathway to
rehabilitation and potential reintegration into society.
In Kenya, various offenses
mandate a life sentence. The Sexual Offences Act, for example, dictates life
imprisonment for anyone convicted of defiling a child aged eleven years or
younger.[3]
Other crimes leading to life sentences include concealment of treason,[4]
treason (specifically for non-citizens),[5]
treachery,[6]
attempted murder,[7]
grievous harm,[8]
aiding suicide,[9]
and intentional killing of an unborn child[10]
among others.
The Kenyan Court of Appeal’s
ruling in Julius Kitsao Manyeso vs. Republic[11]
cited the landmark Francis Karioko Muruatetu v Republic case,[12]
which played a pivotal role in re-evaluating life imprisonment. It was argued
that mandatory life sentences prevent a convict from presenting mitigating
circumstances, an opportunity afforded to those facing lesser sentences. This
was deemed discriminatory and a violation of equality and human dignity under
Articles 27 and 28 of the Constitution, respectively.[13]
The court emphasised on the human nature of the sentence. Building
on this foundation, the court in Mwingirwa v Director of Public Prosecutions
replaced a life sentence with 20 years of imprisonment, emphasizing the need
for rehabilitative opportunities and the possibility of release.[14]
Such decisions underscore a shift towards respecting human rights and the
dignity of the incarcerated.
Justice Sifuna, in Justus
Ndungú Ndungú v Republic,[15]
highlighted the resemblance of life sentences to death sentences, noting that
both lead to a permanent severance from society without hope of reinstatement.
He pointed out the non-mathematical nature of life sentences which become
indefinite and potentially inhumane over time.[16]
In another significant judgment, Simon Irungu Nyambura v Republic,[17]
the court addressed the maximum nature of life sentences. It emphasized that
life imprisonment should not be mandatory or devoid of judicial discretion,
arguing that such sentences should be open to lesser alternatives depending on
the case specifics. The discussion also extends to international jurisprudence.
The European Court of Human Rights in Vinter and others v The United
Kingdom established that indefinite life sentences without the possibility
of release constitute cruel and inhumane punishment.[18]
The court advocated for regular reassessment of the justification for continued
detention, recognizing the dynamic nature of penal rationales over time. In R
v Bieber,[19] a
case from the United Kingdom, it was reasoned that the aims of imprisonment need
to be balanced and reassessed throughout the duration of a life sentence. The
unbounded nature of traditional life sentences is not only seen as unreasonable
but also as absurd and in violation of constitutional rights.
Therefore, to remedy these
issues, the Kenyan judiciary has recommended legislative amendments to cap life
sentences at a maximum of 30 years, offering convicts a defined period of
incarceration and the hope of eventual release.[20]
This recommendation was further enforced in a landmark judgment where the Court
of Appeal limited the life sentence to 30 years, clarifying that this should be
communicated clearly to the accused during sentencing.[21]
Such reforms aim to address the judiciary’s call for legislative action to
resolve the ongoing conflicts in interpreting what constitutes life
imprisonment. A good example to consider is the case of Jackson Maina Wangui &
Another v. Republic[22] where the High Court stated that it is not the
role of the judiciary to determine what amounts to life imprisonment but it is
the role of the legislative branch of government.
In summary, the Kenyan judiciary
has played a crucial role in transforming the interpretation of life
imprisonment, aligning it with principles of fairness, dignity, and human
rights. It has set a precedent that challenges outdated punitive measures and
promotes a more rehabilitative approach to sentencing. The recognition of the
unconstitutionality of life imprisonment by Kenyan courts represents a
significant step towards justice reform, emphasizing the need for legislative
changes to permanently resolve these judicial dilemmas.
[1] Judiciary of Kenya Sentencing Policy Guidelines (2016) page 15,
para 4.1.
[2] ICCPR (1966) Article 10(3). Note that the Constitution of Kenya
2010 at Article 2(6) provides that any treaty or convention that is ratified by
Kenya shall form part of the laws of Kenya. Kenya ratified the ICCPR in 1972
and thus the courts are bound by its provisions.
[3] Sexual Offences Act,
Laws of Kenya, CAP 63A, section 8(2).
[4] Penal Code, Laws of
Kenya CAP 63, section 42.
[5] Ibid, Section 43.
[6] Ibid, Section 43A.
[7] Ibid, Section 220.
[8] Ibid, Section 234.
[9] Ibid, Section 225.
[10] Ibid, Section 228.
[11] Julius Kitsao Manyeso
v Republic, Criminal Application No. 12 of 2021, being a judgement dated 7th
July 2023.
[12] Francis Karioko
Muruatetu v Republic (2017) eKLR.
[13] Julius Kitsao (n 12 above).
[14] Mwingirwa v Director of Public Prosecution (Petition E082 of 2023)
[2023] KEHC 23665 (KLR) (12 October 2023) (Judgment) para 1 and 2.
[15] Justus Ndungú Ndungú v
Rebublic, Criminal Appeal No. E 052 of 2022, para 16.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Simon Irungú Nyambura
v Republic, Criminal Appeal No. 17 of 2019, para 15, 16, 19 and 22.
[18] Vinter and others v The United Kingdom (Application Nos 66069/09,
130/10 and 3896/10) [2016] III ECHR 317 (9 July 2013)
[19] R v Bieber [2009] 1 WLR 223.
[20] Evans Nyamari Ayako v Republic, Criminal Appeal No. 22 of 2018.
[21] Simon Irungú Nyambura
v Republic (n 17) para 25.
[22] Jackson Maina Wangui & Another v. Republic Criminal No. 35 of
2012; [2014] eKLR, para 72 & 76.
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